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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. R

132-134.
Relief should be granted because both Mr. Reid's Brady1 claim and his claim of material
facts, not previously presented and heard, requires vacation of the sentence in the interest of
justice, were erroneously summarily dismissed. Both claims require an evidentiary hearing.

B.

Procedural History and Statement of Facts
Petitioner-Appellant Corey Reid was convicted following a jury trial of two counts of

aiding and abetting first degree murder. He was sentenced to terms of 30 years to life, and the
convictions were affirmed on appeal. State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80,253 P.3d 754 (2011). 2
Mr. Reid filed a timely prose petition for post-conviction relief. R 4-27. He raised two
claims: I) that the conviction and sentence violate the state and federal constitutions; and 2) that
there is new evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard that requires vacating
the conviction and/or sentence in the interest of justice. R 5.
With regard to the new evidence claim, Mr. Reid cited newly discovered evidence
regarding the state's witness Ronald Rollins. Rollins' statements that Mr. Reid had confessed to
him while they were both held in the county jail were used at sentencing against Mr. Reid. The
new evidence included that Mr. Rollins had recanted his statements used at Mr. Reid's

1

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963).

A motion for this Court to augment the record in this appeal with the record from the
underlying direct appeal is pending.
2

sentencing, that Mr. Rollins was given police reports to read prior to making his statements, and
that Mr. Rollins' girlfriend had told the PSI investigator in Mr. Rollins' case that he is a
pathological liar. R 13-14.
Mr. Reid also raised a Brady claim. In particular, the state did not disclose information
that Rollins' girlfriend had told the PSI investigator in Rollins' case that Rollins is a pathological
liar. R 14.
The district court appointed counsel. R 42.
The state filed an answer, R 45-48, as well as a motion to take judicial notice of records,
transcripts, PSI and exhibits in the underlying criminal case, CR-2008-2473. R 49-51. The court
granted the motion for judicial notice. R 52-53.
Mr. Reid's counsel filed an affidavit from Mr. Reid, R 62-65, as well as an amended
petition. R 69-73. This petition raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (Sixth
Amendment) and violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments denying a fair trial
and due process. The basis for all the claims was the following:
... specifically, counsel should have made an opening statement at the beginning
of the case rather than reserve; counsel should have advised me after Judge Gibler
denied our Rule 29 motion, that I should testify, and I would have testified had he
advised me competently. And I should have been permitted to testify; defense
counsel should have pointed out to the Court at sentencing that Mr. Rollins'
accounts were somewhat accurate, not because petitioner said things to him, but
because Mr. Rollins read the police reports; prosecutorial misconduct (Brady
violation) for failing to advise defense counsel that Mr. Rollins' girlfriend stated
that Mr. Rollins was a pathological liar in Mr. Rollins'presentence investigation
report; that the information contained in Rollins' PSI is newly discovered
evidence and entitles Reid to be re-sentenced without consideration of Rollins'
statement.
R 70-71.

2

The state filed an answer. R 74-78.
The state also filed a motion for summary dismissal. R 85-87. Relevant to this appeal,
the state argued that:
1) the Brady claim failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding favorable
evidence that was exculpatory or impeaching, suppressed by the state willfully or inadvertently,
and with resulting prejudice;
2) the newly discovered evidence claim failed to meet the criteria ofICR 34, I.C. § 192406, and the four part test of State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976);
3) the assertions that the same claims resulted in a violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact.
The state further argued that challenges to the credibility of Mr. Rollins and his testimony
at trial3 and arguments at sentencing were or could have been raised on direct appeal and
therefore are barred by res judiciata and the law of the case. R 85-86.
Mr. Reid filed a response to the state's motion. R 119-120.
At the hearing on the motion for summary dismissal, the state argued that dismissal was
appropriate because," ... even if all of the facts and information in his affidavit that Mr. Reid
has submitted to the Court were true, it does not entitle him to judgment as a matter of law on the
specific Stricklancf standard set forth for ineffective assistance of counsel." Tr. 1/13/14, p. 6, ln.
4-8.

3

Mr. Rollins did not testify at trial. Tr. 1/13/14, p. 25, ln. 24-25.

4

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
3

The state further argued that issues regarding Rollins' credibility were decided in the
direct appeal and therefore Mr. Reid's post-conviction claims were barred by law of the case. Tr.
1/13/14, p. 6, ln. 16-p. 7, ln. 5.
With regard to the Brady claim, the state argued that it had no duty to disclose because
the information about Mr. Rollins was not discovered until after Mr. Reid was sentenced and
because the information was discovered in another county and not the county of Mr. Reid's
conviction. Tr. 1/13/14, p. 7, ln. 6-17. See also, R 102-103.
As to the newly discovered evidence claim, the state argued that Mr. Reid was not
entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the district court found that Mr. Rollins lacked
credibility at the time of the original sentencing. Tr. 1/13/14, p. 7, ln. 20 - p. 8, ln. 2.
The district court granted summary dismissal. R 128-13 0. In dismissing the Brady
claim/newly discovered evidence claim, the court reasoned as follows:
The next issue involves counsel's failure to tell the court at the time of sentencing,
that Mr. Rollins, whose statement was simply used at sentencing, not at trial, the
failure to tell the Court that he was a pathological liar and that he had reviewed
police reports which gave him information about the case. This was something
that was considered on appeal. I don't know as that is determinative of the issue
here because this is a post-conviction relief case. What's not clear to me is how
this is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It was the statement used at
sentencing. And as the Supreme Court has made clear on many occasions, the
Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing. And it's really up to me to
determine what's reliable and credible at sentencing and what isn't.
As far as and so certainly the record shows and it is correct that Mr. Smith
raised the proper arguments at sentencing that there had been no opportunity to
cross-examine Mr. Rollins, the statement was hearsay. And I thought those were
arguments that were well taken because, when I ruled on this at sentencing - or
when I did the sentencing, I noted that I was very skeptical of Mr. Rollins's
account. And so again, there's been no evidence to show that somehow Mr.
Smith's conduct here fell below reasonable standards of performance for an
attorney.

4

More importantly, this claim fails the second prong of Strickland that requires
that, even if one presumes ineffective assistance of counsel, which I do not, but
even if one presumes that, that the outcomes would have been different. In my
comments at the time of sentencing, I noted again the skepticism over Rollins's
statements. More importantly, my sentencing decision was made based upon the
evidence I'd heard in the trial, the other information presented in the presentence
report, and the weighed against the goals of sentencing: protection of the public,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment. And so even if the claim is allowed
that it was somehow inefficient assistance of counsel, the outcome would be no
different if there were to be a resentencing.
The next and final claim is a claim what I understand is an alleged Brady violation
for the prosecutor's failing to advise defense counsel that Rollins was a liar.
Again it should be noted that Rollins's statement was used at sentencing, not at
trial. And how this is inefficient assistance of counsel is not clear to me. I don't
see that this allegation really involves decisions made by Mr. Smith. As I noted,
Mr. Smith did make the appropriate objections to the Rollins statements at the
time of sentencing.
The claim seems to be one here against the State for failing to disclose some
evidence. This certainly could have been raised on appeal, but it seems in looking
at the claim, that the evidence that the state was supposed to - allegedly supposed
to have provided was not even known by the state at the time of sentencing.
Again, even if one presumes that somehow this was ineffective assistance of
counsel, the outcome would remain the same. This would certainly not alter the
sentence that I imposed.
So accordingly the motion for summary disposition is granted. The no genuine
issues of material fact have been raised, and the petition will be dismissed with
prejudice.
Tr. 1/13/14, p. 24, ln. 4 -p. 26, ln. 19.
A final judgment was entered. R 130-131. And, this appeal timely follows. R 132-134.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the Brady claim based on its analysis
that the claim could have been raised on appeal and that in any event there was no proof of
Strickland prejudice?

5

2. Did the district court err in not setting the case for an evidentiary hearing on the claim
that newly discovered evidence requires a new sentencing hearing?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Erroneously Dismissed the Brady Claim
1.

Standard ofReview

Summary disposition [of a petition for post-conviction relief] is appropriate if the
applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. LC. § 19-4906(b),
(c). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, [the appellate court] will determine whether a genuine issue
of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions together with
any affidavit on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences
in favor of the non-moving party. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57
P.3d 787, 791 (2002). A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted
allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. Ferrier v.
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). When the alleged facts, even
if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the
application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho
542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the application
are insufficient for the granting ofreliefwhen (1) they are clearly disproved by the
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law.
Id.
Hanschultz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 83 8, 172 P .3d 1109, 1113 (2007).

When the facts alleged by the petitioner, if true, would entitle him to relief, summary
disposition is inappropriate. Id., 144 Idaho at 839, 172 P.3d at 1114.
2.

The District Court Erred in its Analysis of the Brady Claim

The district court analyzed Mr. Reid's Brady claim both as a claim that could have been
raised on direct appeal and was not and as an ineffective (or as the court termed it "inefficient")
assistance of trial counsel claim finding no prejudice and therefore summarily dismissing the
claim.

6

Both of these analyses are erroneous.
Mr. Reid's Brady claim could not have been raised in direct appeal because the facts
underlying the claim were not and could not have been developed in the trial. Mr. Reid could not
have brought forth facts regarding Rollins' credibility at trial because Rollins was not a witness
at trial and Mr. Reid could not have brought forth facts of the failure to disclose Rollins'
girlfriend's statements for Rollins' PSI interview as those statements were not made until after
trial. Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421,426, 745 P.2d 300,305 (Ct. App. 1987), stating" ... postconviction proceedings do not preclude claims or issues based upon facts beyond the record
presented on appeal, if those facts could not, or customarily would not, have been developed in
the trial on criminal charges."
Likewise, the Brady claim should not have been summarily dismissed because Mr. Reid
did not present evidence to meet the Strickland deficiency and prejudice prongs of the ineffective
assistance of counsel test. A Brady claim is distinct from a Strickland claim.
[The constitution] requires that the prosecution disclose all exculpatory evidence.
This duty to disclose encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory
evidence. A defendant's due process rights are violated where the prosecution
fails to disclose exculpatory evidence that is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.
State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 72-73, 14 P.3d 388, 392-393 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted).

In determining that a Brady claim should have been raised in appeal and then applying
the ineffective assistance of counsel standard to the claim, the district court erred in its analysis
of the Brady claim.
7

3.

A Proper Brady Analysis Demonstrates that Summary Disposition is
Inappropriate

To properly analyze Mr. Reid's Brady claim, a review of the evidence presented at trial
and the record of the sentencing hearing is necessary. The evidence at trial was summarized by
the Court of Appeals in the direct appeal:
On August 4, 2008, Reid, Jon Kienholz, Hiram Wilson, Neil Howard, and
Cynthia Bewick were at a campground at Dobson Pass outside of Wallace, Idaho.
Kienholz shot and killed Howard and Bewick. Reid was charged with aiding and
abetting in both murders. Kienholz and Wilson testified against Reid at trial.
According to Kienholz's testimony, he developed a plan to drive to Bolivia and
earn a living there selling illegal substances. Reid wanted to go with him because
of an upcoming legal proceeding. Howard and Bewick, who were dating, also
wanted to go because they thought they had outstanding warrants for their arrest.
The group planned to drive Howard's vehicle. On the morning of the murders,
Kienholz called a friend and arranged to trade marijuana for a pistol. Reid was in
the car and overheard Kienholz's conversation. Kienholz dropped off Reid,
bought a .22 caliber pistol, and then returned for Reid. Reid observed the pistol.
They then picked up Reid's girlfriend, Kristen Purtill, and drove to the house
where Howard and Bewick were staying. It was there that Howard and Bewick
told Kienholz that they thought Purtill was going to tum them in on their warrants.
Kienholz told Reid about this accusation and both Reid and Purtill became angry.
Kienholz obtained a full box of .22 ammunition. The group of five drove to
Dobson Pass and stopped at a campsite, almost a mile off of the road, where they
started a fire. Kienholz and Reid decided to take a short trip to town, leaving
Purtill, Howard, and Bewick at the campsite. However, when Howard got his
pocket knife out of the car, Purtill refused to stay. Kienholz, Reid, and Purtill
then left in Howard's vehicle. As the three drove away from the campsite, Reid
became angry that Howard retrieved his knife and told Kienholz "We have to kill
them." They dropped off Purtill in town and picked up Reid's cousin, Wilson.
Reid told Wilson that they were going to kill Howard and Bewick. The three then
returned to Dobson Pass and parked on the main road. Wilson retrieved the pistol
and Reid retrieved the .22 shells to give to Kienholz. The three then walked to the
campground and talked about how they would commit the murders. With the
pistol hidden below Kienholz's shirt, the three walked into the campground.
Kienholz talked to Howard while glancing at Reid. Reid was silently mouthing
the words to Kienholz "Come on, do it." Kienholz shot Howard in the head, and
then shot Bewick. Kienholz and Wilson then dumped the bodies down a hill. As
the three headed back to the car, Reid removed a number of .22 shells from his

8

pocket and discarded them. The three then picked up Purtill and drove to Boise.
According to Wilson's testimony, when Wilson got in the vehicle with Kienholz
and Reid, Reid told Wilson that they needed to kill Howard and Bewick. On the
drive to Dobson Pass, Kienholz and Reid talked about how they were going to
commit the murders. When the vehicle stopped, Reid got the shells out of the
glove box, handed Kienholz six shells, and kept a number in his own pocket in
case Kienholz missed. As the three were waiting outside the campsite, Reid told
Kienholz to just walk into the campsite and shoot them. The three then walked
into the campsite, and Kienholz talked to Howard. Wilson did not see Reid
mouth any words to Kienholz. Kienholz shot Howard once, kicked Bewick, shot
her four times, and then shot Howard again. Wilson and Kienholz then disposed
of the bodies. On the walk back, Reid discarded the shells from his pocket. The
group traveled to Boise, where Reid assured Kienholz that it had to be done
because Howard was going to kill Purtill. After running out of money, Wilson
returned home and turned himself in to the police.

The jury convicted Reid of aiding and abetting in the first degree murders of
Howard and Bewick. For sentencing purposes, the State submitted a transcript of
a conversation between Detective Morgan and Ronald Rollins, a prior cellmate of
Reid's, in which Rollins described conversations with Reid regarding the murders.
The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of life with thirty years
determinate on each count. Reid appeals.
State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 82-83, 253 P.3d 754, 756-57 (Ct. App. 2011).

At sentencing, the defense and state agreed to use a presentence investigation report (PSI)
prepared for a 2008 conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Trial Tr. p. 758, ln. 2-7,
p. 786, ln. 18-20. The PSI was an exhibit on appeal. Tr R 404.
That PSI reported a minimal criminal history. Mr. Reid who was 21 at the time of
sentencing, had two prior offenses of tobacco possession/distribution/use by a minor, two alcohol
possession by a minor, a failure to provide proof of insurance and failure to register a vehicle, a
possession of drug paraphernalia, and a driving under the influence. He had no prior violent
offense convictions. PSI p. 3-4.

9

A court ordered substance abuse evaluation was also prepared and is in the record of the
direct appeal. Tr R 404. The evaluation found that Mr. Reid has alcohol dependence,
amphetamine dependence, cannabis dependence, and cocaine dependence. Ex. Evaluation from
Alliance Family Services, p. 1.
The day of sentencing, the state filed "Documentation in Support of State's Sentencing
Recommendation." Tr R 354-378. Based upon this documentation, the state asked for a
sentence greater than that which had been imposed on Mr. Kienholz. Trial Tr. p. 763, ln. 23 - p.
768, In. 11; p. 784, ln. 1-4.
The state's documentation was a "draft" Idaho State Police Report which included the
transcript of an unswom interview between Detective Morgan, a deputy prosecuting attorney, and
Ronald Rollins, Jr., conducted on January 22, 2009. Tr R 357. (Mr. Reid's trial was held in May
2009.) This interview was highly damaging to Mr. Reid.
The narrative summary is as follows:
1. On 01-22-09, at approximately 1130 hours, Ronald ROLLINS Jr. Was

interviewed by Deputy Prosecutor Verharen and me [Officer Terry Morgan]. The
interview was regarding conversations that Corey REID had with ROLLINS about
REID's involvement in the deaths ofNeil HOWARD and Cynthia BEWICK.
ROLLINS was housed in the same area as REID in the Shoshone County Jail.
ROLLINS was incarcerated on misdemeanor probation violation charges and was
booked into jail on 11-14-08.
2. REID started talking to ROLLINS about REID's involvement in the murders
within hours after meeting ROLLINS. REID would laugh when he told the story
about involvement with the murders. ROLLINS said REID told him how he
(REID) kicked BEWICK in the jaw and broke her jaw off the side of her face
when she was begging Jon KIEHOLZ to stop shooting her and then REID would
laugh about what he did and how she looked.
3. REID said he stood behind BEWICK and made his hand into the shape of a
gun and was motioning to KIENHOLZ to shoot her. He said he planned the

10

killing of HOWARD and BEWICK with KIENHOLZ several days prior to 08-0408. REID said Hiram WILSON did not know anything about the shooting of
HOWARD and BEWICK until it happened and that REID threatened to shoot
WILSON if he (WILSON) didn't help dispose of the bodies.
4. REID said he and KIENHOLZ got caught by a friend's father while trying to
get into a gun safe prior to finally obtaining the .22 caliber gun they got. The gun
they had was obtained from someone who lives near the Wallace cemetery and it
was obtained by pawning something to get money to buy marijuana and trade
marijuana for the gun.

5. REID said Christan PURTILL did not have knowledge of the planning or
killing until after it happened. REID said he was going to use the defense that
KIENHOLZ was going to kill him (REID) if he (REID) didn't help kill
HOWARD and BEWICK. ROLLINS asked REID ifhe was afraid KIENHOLZ
was going to shoot him and REID said "hell, no, we planned this for several days
before the killing".
6. The interview was concluded at approximately 1245 hours. Refer to the DVD
(Exhibit #222) for complete interview and details.
Tr R 355-356.
The transcript of the entire interview was included with the documentation. Tr R 357378.
At sentencing, defense counsel argued against reliance on Rollins' interview. Trial Tr. p.
770, In. 15 - p. 771, ln. 5.
However, the district court did rely on the interview. The court stated:
... The state submitted documentation in support of sentencing consisting
primarily of the transcript of the interview of Ronald Rollins, Jr., that was taken in
jail. And Mr. Smith quite properly has pointed out that we have nothing to judge
the credibility of Mr. Rollins. He's not here. He's not subject to crossexamination. And I recognize that and recognize that, without live testimony and
cross-examination, the statements should be taken with a grain of salt.
But one thing that occurred to me, as I was looking through the statements, was
that the statements were made prior to the trial or any real discussion of the facts
of the case. And Mr. Rollins did have a good knowledge of the facts of the case

11

based upon what he stated that Mr. Reid had told him while they were in jail
together. And so, recognizing that he was not subject to cross-examination, there
is some evidence just from the statements, themselves, that they do have an
element of credibility because he has details that would not have been know to
him except had they been given him by Mr. Reid, as he stated. And I'm referring
there to elements that - or details of the facts that came out during trial.
The facts involving Mr. Reid's involvements in these crimes is important. It's
correct, as Mr. Smith has pointed out, that Mr. Reid did not pull the trigger. But
as shown by the testimony at trial and the information submitted for sentencing,
Mr. Reid does have responsibility for the cold-blooded murder of these two
victims. The murders were initiated by Mr. Reid. It's not simply a case where he
made a suggestion to Mr. Kienholz. It went beyond that. There was planning that
was involved. He helped plan the murders, and he voluntarily and actively
participated in the murders.
Today he has apologized for his actions, but beyond that there's been little
presented to me to show that he, first of all, really appreciates his role in these
crimes, and I question the sincerity of his statements ofremorse made here today.
The facts of his involvement in these crimes show that he, as I stated, was an
active participant.
Trial Tr. p. 788, ln. 19 - p. 790, ln. 6.
Mr. Reid was sentenced on September 24, 2009. Trial Tr. p. 757, In. 13.
On March 4, 2010, a PSI was filed in State v. Rollins, CR-2009-0023129, Kootenai
County. On July 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals filed its opinion in Mr. Rollins' appeal. State v.
Rollins, 152 Idaho 106,266 P.3d 1211 (Ct. App. 2011). The Court summarized Mr. Rollins' PSI

noting Mr. Rollins' criminal history, including several crimes of dishonesty, the history of mental
illness in his family, his ex-girlfriend's statement that he is a pathological liar, had stolen from
her, had caused her severe financial difficulties and possibly had mental health problems similar
to his mother, a recitation of his history of drug addiction spanning over the time he had given
the statement used in Mr. Reid's case, and Mr. Rollins' statement that he would like a mental
health evaluation. 152 Idaho at 108,266 P.3d at 1213, R 21.
12

In his pro se petition, Mr. Reid claimed that the information in the Rollins PSI, which
was not shared with him was both new evidence and a Brady violation insofar as the state never
disclosed this information to him. R 13-14. These claims were restated in the amended petition.
R 70.

The state argued in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary dismissal that
there was not a basis for a Brady claim because the withheld information was obtained by the
state after the sentencing hearing and because it was in the possession of Kootenai County, not
the Shoshone County prosecutor. Lastly, the state argued that there could have been no prejudice
to Mr. Reid because the district court gave no credibility to Mr. Rollins' statement at sentencing.
R 102-103.

The state's arguments, although not considered by the district court, were invalid. The
duty to provide discovery under Brady is not limited to the time before trial; rather, it is an
ongoing responsibility, which extends throughout the duration of the trial and even after
conviction. Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749-750 (9 th Cir. 1992); In re Pratt, 69
Cal.App.4th 1294, 1312 (Cal. App. 1999); People v. Kasim, 56 Cal.App. 4 th 1360, 1383-1884
(Cal. App. 1997). But see, District Attorney's Office of the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129
S.Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009), stating that Brady does not apply in a post-conviction request for access
to DNA evidence.
And, further, although the state argues that the county prosecutor did not have a duty to
disclose exculpatory or impeaching evidence obtained by a different county, in fact, the state's
officers included the Attorney General by the time both Mr. Reid's and Mr. Rollins' cases were
on appeal - and the Attorney General was clearly aware of both the use of Mr. Rollins'
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statements against Mr. Reid in Mr. Reid's case and of the evidence obtained in conjunction with
Mr. Rollins' PSI and thus was obligated to inform Mr. Reid of the evidence.
Further, the district court's statements at sentencing do raise a genuine question of
material fact as to whether the court relied on Rollins' statements in sentencing Mr. Reid. While
the court noted that the statements were to be taken with a grain of salt, the court also said it
found the statements reliable as demonstrated by their consistency with evidence from the trial.
And, finally, had the evidence regarding Rollins' credibility and the state's actions in
showing him police reports prior to making his statements been available at sentencing, there is a
reasonable probability that a different outcome would have resulted. Mr. Reid's sentence was
imposed after the court read statements from Rollins regarding Mr. Reid gloating over and
laughing at the pain and deaths caused, claiming he was not afraid ofKeinholz, and speculating
that he would escape punishment. This was all information not presented at trial, and all
information that informed the court, through Mr. Rollins' statements, that Mr. Reid did not have
sincere remorse for or understand the role of his actions. There is a reasonable probability that
this belief in Mr. Reid's insincerity and lack of remorse affected the sentence imposed because
people without remorse or understanding of their roles in wrongdoing are generally perceived to
be more dangerous and harder to rehabilitate that those who do regret and understand their
actions. Those who are more dangerous are deserving of longer sentences under Idaho law.
State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho at 114, 266 P .3d at 1219.

When the Brady claim is properly analyzed, it is clear that summary disposition was
improperly granted because the claim does raise a genuine issue of material fact.
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B.

An Evidentiary Hearing Should Have Been Granted on the Claim that there Exists
Evidence of Material Facts, Not Previously Presented and Heard, that Requires
Vacation of the Sentence in the Interest of Justice
Mr. Reid's pro se petition raised a claim of material facts, not previously presented and

heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice. R 5.
Specifically, Mr. Reid noted that there was evidence that Mr. Rollins had recanted his story of
Mr. Reid's confession and behavior while in the jail and further stated that he had been bribed for
the statement by the prosecuting attorney; evidence that the prosecutor gave Mr. Rollins
transcripts of others' written recorded testimony to read prior to making his statement against Mr.
Reid; and evidence that Mr. Rollins' girlfriend told a PSI investigator that Mr. Rollins is a
pathological liar. R 13-14.
The amended petition filed by counsel carried this claim forward by asserting that a new
sentencing hearing was required because his attorney did not inform the sentencing court that Mr.
Rollins had read the police reports before giving his statement used at sentencing to the
prosecutor and because the information in Mr. Rollins' PSI was newly discovered. R 64-65, 71.
However, the district court did not coherently address the claim in its ruling granting summary
dismissal. Tr. 1/13/14, p. 18, ln. 1 - p. 26, ln. 25.
The claim should have been properly addressed and a new sentencing hearing granted.
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a)(4) allows post-conviction relief where there exists evidence of
material facts not previously presented and heard that requires vacation of the sentence in the
interest of justice. To obtain this relief, a petitioner must present evidence of facts that existed at
the time of sentencing that would have been relevant to the sentencing process and that indicate
the information available to the parties or the trial court at the time of sentencing was false,
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incomplete, or otherwise materially misleading. Bure v. State, 126 Idaho 253, 254-55, 880 P.2d
1241, 1242-43. See also, Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 125, 952 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Ct. App.
1998); and Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433,440, 163 P.3d 222,229 (Ct. App. 2007).
With regard to recanted testimony, a new sentencing hearing should be granted when the
recanted testimony reasonably could have affected the sentencing decision. Bean v. State, 124
Idaho 187, 190,858 P.2d 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1993). In Bean, a new sentencing hearing was
granted when the district court relied on false evidence to conclude that Bean's culpability in a
murder was "great" while a co-defendant's culpability was "slight." The Court of Appeals held:
Had the true facts been known to Judge Thomas, he may have chosen to impose
upon Bean an indeterminate, rather than fixed, life sentence. Under these
circumstances, the remedy sought by Bean - seeking a vacation of his sentence in
the interest of justice - was appropriate. It follows that Bean's sentence should
have been set aside and he should have been resentenced by the district court
based on current information without regard to the original sentencing decision
reached by Judge Thomas, inasmuch as the previous decision was tainted by
perjurious and erroneous information thought correct at the time.

Id, at 190-191, 858 P.2d at 331-332.
In this case, the district court relied upon Mr. Rollins' statements in imposing a 30-year to
life sentence. As noted in the court's comments at the sentencing hearing, the court relied upon
Mr. Rollins' statement to the prosecutor in concluding that Mr. Reid was as or more culpable
than Mr. Kienholz. And, as discussed above, it was Rollins' statements which were offered at
sentencing and not at trial that showed Mr. Reid to be without pity or remorse, something that
surely influenced the sentence imposed. As in Bean, there is now evidence that Mr. Rollins has
recanted his statements, that the statements were the product of state bribery, that the statements
were based upon reading police reports and co-defendant testimony rather than based upon
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confessions or actions by Mr. Reid, and that Mr. Rollins is known to be a pathological liar. This
evidence at the very least requires an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether Mr. Reid
should be granted a new sentencing hearing. See Bean, supra. See also, Knutsen v. State, supra,
reversing an order of summary dismissal where a neuropsychological evaluation raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether there exists evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard, that requires a resentencing hearing. See also Vick v. State, supra.
On this basis also, the order of summary dismissal should be reversed and the case
remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Reid requests that this Court reverse the order of
summary dismissal and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing.
Respectfully submitted this

---~
V
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